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Abstract 
Over the years, many OECD countries, including the United States, have 
identified tax havens as a significant problem, and have acted to limit the ability of their 
taxpayers to use tax havens to reduce their taxes.  The United States has implemented tax 
regimes, including subpart F and the passive foreign investment company rules, and 
disclosure regimes, such as the recently-enacted FATCA rules, to prevent U.S. taxpayers 
from taking advantage of tax haven jurisdictions. 
But the intersection of a number of U.S. tax rules, it turns out, makes the United 
States an attractive place for foreigners to invest—and hide—their money.  Principal 
among these is the revenue rule, an eighteenth-century common law rule that prevents 
the United States from recognizing and enforcing foreign tax judgments.  As a result, if a 
foreign taxpayer hides money in the United States and fails to pay taxes at home, her 
government has no recourse to satisfy the tax debt with the taxpayer’s U.S. assets.  Such 
hidden money disparately impacts developing countries by reducing their ability to 
finance government through developing tax infrastructure, and instead forcing them to 
remain dependent on foreign aid. 
The revenue rule stands in stark contrast to the general default rule that U.S. 
courts will enforce foreign final judgments.  But the revenue rule is not grounded in any 
compelling policy considerations.  Moreover, to the extent that the U.S. revokes the 
revenue rule, not only will the U.S. aid other countries—including, especially, developing 
countries—but it may receive reciprocal aid in collecting taxes from U.S. taxpayers with 
assets held overseas.  This Article argues that the U.S. should revoke the revenue rule, 
both from a moral obligation to aid developing economies in becoming self-sufficient and 
to receive reciprocal aid in collecting taxes being held overseas.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Nobody likes tax havens.1  No country in the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (“OECD”), at any rate.  In 2000, the OECD released a 
blacklist of tax havens that had not cooperated with its attempts to eliminate harmful tax 
practices.2  It gave those thirty-five countries one year to reform their harmful practices, 
at which point member states would begin to impose sanctions on the remaining 
blacklisted tax havens.3 
While nearly a decade and a half has passed since the OECD began its 
crackdown on tax havens, they still exist, and U.S. taxpayers continue to funnel money 
through tax havens to reduce their taxes.  The U.S. loses an estimated $40 billion to $70 
billion in governmental revenues annually to taxpayers’ abusive use of tax havens. 4  
Major U.S. corporations, including Microsoft, Hewlett-Packard, and Apple, have faced 
public condemnation at disclosures that they have used tax havens to avoid U.S. taxes.5  
The U.S. has enacted a number of tax provisions intended to check taxpayers’ 
ability to reduce their taxes through the use of tax havens.  Subpart F, for example, taxes 
certain U.S. shareholders currently on their share of a foreign corporation’s income, 
while the passive foreign investment company rules eliminate the benefits of deferral on 
offshore passive investments.  As I’ve previously written, the United States imposes 
punitive taxes on certain tax haven investments even when the investor is acting in a 
manner consistent with congressional intent.6 
But what if the United States is a tax haven?  Or, more specifically, what if 
federal tax law makes the United States an attractive place for foreign individuals to hide 
their money?7  Though it sounds counterintuitive, even the OECD has acknowledged that 
member states (including the United States) engaged in certain harmful tax practices.8  
If in fact the United States is offended by and committed to attacking tax havens, 
it must address those parts of its tax law that make it attractive to foreign persons who 
want to hide assets from their governments.  One easy way to reduce the attractiveness of 
the U.S. to tax evaders—while not discouraging legitimate foreign investment—would be 
to revoke the revenue rule, which prevents U.S. courts from enforcing foreign tax 
judgments.  Without the revenue rule, individuals evading taxes in their home countries 
would risk losing the assets they had hidden in the United States; foreign taxpayers 
current on their foreign taxes, on the other hand, would face no such risk.  As a result, the 
United States could help other countries—and especially developing countries—at 
                                                     
1 This is not completely true, of course.  Some privacy advocates and libertarian think tanks argue 
that tax havens, among other things, promote tax competition, thus reducing the rates of tax and spending of 
high-tax countries.  See, e.g., David D. Stewart, Privacy Advocates Praise Tax Evasion, 125 TAX NOTES 649, 
649 (2009). 
2 Robert Goulder, OECD Releases Tax Haven Blacklist, 88 TAX NOTES 32, 32 (2000). 
3 Id. 
4 Samuel D. Brunson, Repatriating Tax-Exempt Investments: Tax Havens, Blocker Corporations, 
and Unrelated Debt-Financed Income, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 225, 237 (2012). 
5 See Editorial, "A" Is for Avoidance, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2013, at SR10 ("Rampant corporate tax 
avoidance may not be illegal, but that doesn't make it right or fair."). 
6 See Brunson, supra note 4, at 271 ("However, Congress clearly never intended for tax-exempt 
entities to pay taxes on their investment income.  Moreover, the IRS has blessed investment by a tax-exempt 
entity through offshore blocker corporations as being nonabusive."). 
7 See infra notes 51–77and accompanying text. 
8 See Goulder, supra note 2, at 33–34 (listing the U.S. foreign sales corporation regime as a harmful 
tax practice). 
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minimal expense to itself, while acting consistently with its desire to protect its own 
revenue from countries engaging in harmful tax practices.  
This article proceeds as follows.  Part II discusses tax havens.  It looks 
specifically at the legal regimes that allow a country to act as a tax haven.  It also 
discusses the ways in which tax havens impede developing countries from establishing 
the administrative capacity to collect the revenue they need to become self-sufficient.  It 
finally describes ways in which the United States resembles a tax haven, imposing little, 
if any, tax on certain types of U.S.-source income earned by foreigners, with significant 
secrecy, and with its unwillingness to enforce foreign tax judgments. 
Part III then discusses the ways in which victorious foreign litigants can enforce 
non-revenue money judgments awarded by foreign courts in the U.S.  Part IV looks at the 
revenue rule, which prevents U.S. courts from recognizing or enforcing foreign revenue 
judgments.  I conclude that there is no compelling justification for maintaining the 
revenue rule, and that the revenue rule should be revoked in the interest of international 
tax fairness. 
Parts V and VI then provide a framework for how such revocation should 
proceed.  Part V goes through a number of policy issues that must be considered in the 
process of eliminating the revenue rule, including why its revocation is a better solution 
to the problem of the U.S. as tax haven than other solutions.  Finally, Part VI looks at the 
practical and administrative aspects of revoking the revenue rule. 
II. CAPITAL FLIGHT FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Every year, developing countries lose hundreds of billions of dollars to capital 
flight.  In 2010, the Center for International Policy estimated that developing countries 
lost between $783.2 billion and $1.138 trillion in illicit capital flight alone.9  To put this 
amount in context, developing countries receive only about $70 billion in official 
development assistance, and about $250 billion in foreign direct investment, annually.10  
Capital flight, moreover, creates real problems for developing countries.11  For purposes 
of this Article, the most salient effect of capital flight is its ability to undermine a 
developing country’s tax system and public finances.12  "Tax evasion undermines the 
funding of the state and, thus, the legitimacy associate with the state through the delivery 
of public services[.]"13  Developing countries rely on capital taxes for a large percentage 
                                                     
9 DEV KAR & SARAH FREITAS, GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRITY, ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS FROM 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: 2001–2010, at 6,  available at 
http://iff.gfintegrity.org/documents/dec2012Update/Illicit_Financial_Flows_from_Developing_Countries_20
01-2010-HighRes.pdf. 
10 Peter Reuter, Policy and Research Implications of Illicit Flows, in DRAINING DEVELOPMENT? 
CONTROLLING FLOWS OF ILLICIT FUNDS FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 483, 484 (Peter Reuter ed. 2012). 
11 Among other things, it removes from developing countries assets that could be invested, it can 
encourage rent-seeking, and can negatively affect a country’s balance of payments.  A. Albakin & J. 
Whalley, The Problem of Capital Flight from Russia, 22 WORLD ECON. 421, 433–34 (1999).  At the 
extremes, capital flight can even destabilize an economy or trigger international chain reactions.  Id. at 421.  
12 GOV’T COMM’N ON CAPITAL FLIGHT FROM POOR COUNTRIES, TAX HAVENS AND DEVELOPMENT 10 
(2009). 
13 Max Everest-Phillips, The Political Economy of Controlling Tax Evasion and Illicit Flows, in 
DRAINING DEVELOPMENT?  CONTROLLING FLOWS OF ILLICIT FUNDS FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 69, 71 
(Peter Reuter ed. 2012). 
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of their tax receipts; as capital disappears from the country, either the government’s 
revenue decreases or it must impose higher taxes on a narrower tax base.14 
For developing economies to grow, they must pursue a policy of "strong public 
investment," which will allow them to develop the necessary infrastructure and skills to 
support future growth.15  This public investment requires money.  Developing countries 
have a number of ways that they can obtain revenue, including selling natural resources,16  
obtaining foreign aid,17 and taxing their citizens and residents.18  Though developing 
countries can fund infrastructure and other programs using money from any of these 
sources, arguable, to fully develop, a country needs tax revenue.  A country that cannot 
effectively collect taxes faces significant limitations on "the extent to which [it] can 
provide security, meet basic needs or foster economic development."19  With widespread 
poverty, developing countries need social insurance programs more than developed 
countries.20  They need to invest in education, which many believe key to development.21  
And some developing countries need tax revenue to ensure the survival of government.22  
And developing countries’ need for an effective tax regime may go beyond merely 
funding essential infrastructure: arguably, "bargaining over tax is the basis of the social 
contract between the state and its citizens and a key building block in the development of 
democracy."23 
A. Tax Havens 
Half of world trade passes through tax havens, including half of bank assets and 
one-third of foreign direct investment.24  In the mid-2000s, an estimated $11 trillion (or 
one-third of the world’s GDP) in assets were held in tax haven jurisdictions. 25  
Approximately a "quarter of global wealth is stashed in havens."26  Although the secrecy 
inherent in tax haven makes it difficult to know for certain, these assets likely include a 
significant portion of the capital flight from developing countries. 
                                                     
14 GOV’T COMM’N ON CAPITAL FLIGHT FROM POOR COUNTRIES, supra note 12, at 10.  Perhaps for 
this reason, foreign borrowing increases concurrently with capital flight.  Valerie Cerra, et al., Robbing the 
Riches: Capital Flight, Institutions and Debt, 44 J. DEV. STUDIES 1190, 1197 (2008) ("Many studies find that 
an increase in foreign borrowing, particularly by the public sector, is concurrent with outflows by domestic 
residents and firms."). 
15  COMMISSION ON GROWTH & DEVELOPMENT, THE GROWTH REPORT: STRATEGIES FOR SUSTAINED 
GROWTH AND INCLUSIVE DEVELOPMENT 34 (2008), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTPREMNET/Resources/489960-
1338997241035/Growth_Commission_Final_Report.pdf. 
16 Id. at 8. 
17 Id. at 1. 
18 Id. at 35–36. 
19 Deborah A. Bräutigam, Introduction: Taxation and State-Building in Developing Countries, in 
TAXATION AND STATE-BUILDING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: CAPACITY AND CONSENT 1, 1 (Deborah A. 
Bräutigam et al. eds. 2008). 
20 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare 
State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1640 (2000). 
21 Id. at 1640–41. 
22 Id. at 1640. 
23 Paul Collier et al., Managing Resource Revenues in Developing Economies, 57 IMF Staff Papers 
84, 104 (2010). 
24 Lee A. Sheppard, A Tax Haven by Any Other Name, 131 TAX NOTES 1111, 1111 (2011). 
25 John Cristensen & Richard Murphy, The Social Irresponsibility of Corporate Tax Avoidance: 
Taking CSR to the Bottom Line, DEVELOPMENT, Sept. 2004, at 37, 39.  Currently the International Monetary 
Fund recognizes more than sixty tax haven jurisdictions.  Id. at 39–40. 
26 Sheppard, supra note 24, at 1112. 
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In spite of the centrality of tax havens in the global economy, attempts to define 
what constitutes a tax haven generally "devolve into some form of totality of the 
circumstances analysis . . . or, even worse, an 'I know it when I see it' approach"27  
Broadly speaking, though, a tax haven is a "low-tax jurisdictions that provide investors 
opportunities for tax avoidance."28  Various organizations, including the International 
Monetary Fund,29 the OECD,30 the Tax Justice Network,31 and even the U.S. Congress,32 
have published lists of tax haven jurisdictions.  The lists of tax havens tend to include 
primarily non-OECD nations, including various Caribbean islands, Bermuda, Hong 
Kong, Singapore, Jersey, and Mauritius.33 
The OECD has attempted to move beyond merely knowing tax havens when it 
sees them.  It listed four key factors for identifying harmful preferential tax regimes: low 
or zero effective tax rate, ring-fencing, lack of transparency, and lack of effective 
information exchanges.34   A tax haven jurisdiction, the OECD explained, would "be 
characterized by a combination of a low or zero effective tax rate and one or more other" 
key factor.35 
In evaluating the first factor—whether a country has a low tax rate—the OECD 
looks not only at the statutory rate, but at the way the country defines its tax base.36  It 
does not, however, delineate what constitutes harmfully low tax rate and what does not.  
Some countries, such as Bermuda and Anguilla, impose no income tax, and clearly meet 
this criterion.37  Other countries that impose taxes, such as Ireland and Switzerland, have 
nonetheless been accused of being tax havens.38  Ireland has a corporate tax rate of 12.5 
                                                     
27 Adam H. Rosenzweig, Why Are There Tax Havens?, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 923, 940 n.49 
(2010).  
28 Mihir A. Desai et al., The Demand for Tax Haven Operations, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 513, 514 (2006). 
29 See Ronen Palan, Tax Havens and the Commercialization of State Sovereignty, 56 INT’L ORG. 
151, 151 n.1 (2002) ("An International Monetary Fund (IMF) study lists nearly seventy tax havens . . . ."). 
30 Jane G. Gravelle, Tax Havens: International Tax Avoidance and Evasion, 62 NAT. TAX J. 727, 
728 (2009) ("The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2000) created an initial list of 
tax havens."). 
31 Id. at 731–32. 
32 Id. at 728–29. 
33 See id. at 729 (listing countries on various tax haven lists).  Though not all tax havens are islands, 
islands represent the prototypical tax haven.  Some commentators argue, though, that the biggest island tax 
havens are Manhattan and London.  See, e.g., Marshall J. Langer, Harmful Tax Competition: Who Are the 
Real Tax Havens?, 21 TAX NOTES INT’L 2831, 2832–33 (2000). 
34 OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE 27 (1998), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/0/1904176.pdf [hereinafter, OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION].  Though 
the OECD calls these "harmful preferential tax regimes," they serve essentially the same function as tax 
havens.  See id. at 8 ("The Report is intended to develop a better understanding of how tax havens and 
harmful preferential tax regimes, collectively referred to as harmful tax practices, affect the location of 
financial and other service activities, erode the tax bases of other countries, distort trade and investment 
patterns and undermine the fairness, neutrality and broad social acceptance of tax systems generally.").  
Because "tax haven" is not a term of art, but is a more familiar terminology than "harmful preferential tax 
regime," I will use the two terms interchangeably in this Article. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 26. 
37 Alex Cobham, Tax Havens and Illicit Flows, in DRAINING DEVELOPMENT? CONTROLLING FLOWS 
OF ILLICIT FUNDS FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 337, 340 (2012). 
38 See, e.g., id. (tax havens include "countries with low taxation (e.g., Switzerland, the Channel 
Islands)"); Jeremy Scott, Apple and Ireland Try to Win Spin Battle With the Senate, 139 TAX NOTES 1089, 
1089 (2013) ("PSI Chair Carl Levin basically called Ireland a tax haven . . . ."). 
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percent, while Switzerland taxes corporate income at a rate of 8.5 percent.39  While both 
rates are comparatively low—in 2013, the average OECD corporate tax rate was about 23 
percent40—it is not clear why 8.5 percent or 12.5 percent is the appropriate cut-off for a 
low tax rate. 
A tax haven’s low tax rates do not apply to everybody, though.  As its second 
factor, the OECD looks at whether a country ring-fences its preferential rates to ensure 
that they get the revenue they need.  "Ring-fencing" means that the tax haven prevents 
residents from benefiting from the low- or no-tax regime, while preventing foreigners 
from accessing domestic markets.41  That is, they "offer a zero tax rate to nonresidents 
who park their money there but tax residents fully."42  Ring-fencing their preferential tax 
regime allows tax haven jurisdictions to attract foreign capital with the promise of low or 
no taxes while concurrently raising revenue to fund governmental services by collecting 
taxes from residents. 
The third factor requires a lack of transparency.  A transparent tax regime clearly 
lays out how the tax applies to taxpayers and makes the details of the regime available to 
the tax authorities of other interested countries.43  A tax regime lacks transparency when, 
for example, the "tax laws are negotiable or employed selectively in favor of foreign 
investors as a matter of practice."44  This lack of transparency can arise as the result of 
favorable administrative rulings that allow a particular sector to pay less tax, special 
administrative practices, or even a country’s decision not to enforce its tax laws against 
certain taxpayers.45 
The OECD’s final key factor is that a tax haven lacks the ability or willingness to 
effectively exchange information.46   This lack of effective information exchange can 
result from secrecy laws.47  Switzerland, for example, has strict bank secrecy laws, the 
violation of which can result in criminal sanctions.48  Similarly, Cayman Islands law 
makes revealing certain financial information a criminal offense.49  Even where a country 
                                                     
39 Andrew Pike, U.S. Taxes Corporate Income at Comparatively Low Rate, 134 TAX NOTES 1533, 
1546 (2012). 
40 http://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/tax-database.htm#C_CorporateCaptial (follow the "Basic 
(non-targeted) corporate income tax" link for an Excel spreadsheet containing tax rates). 
41 Joann M. Weiner & Hugh J. Ault, The OECD’s Report on Harmful Tax Competition, 51 NAT. 
TAX J. 601, 604 (1998).  That is, they "offer a zero tax rate to nonresidents who park their money there buy 
tax residents fully."  
42 NICHOLAS SHAXSON, TREASURE ISLANDS: UNCOVERING THE DAMAGE OF OFFSHORE BANKING AND 
TAX HAVENS 12 (2011). 
43 OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 34, at 28. 
44 Keith Engel, Tax Neutrality to the Left, International Competitiveness to the Right, Stuck in the 
Middle With Subpart F, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1525, 1559 (2001). 
45 OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 34, at 28–29. 
46 Id. at 29. 
47 Id. 
48 Kristen A. Parillo, Switzerland, U.S. Sign FATCA Agreement, 138 TAX NOTES 803, 803 (2013).  
Under a recently-enacted intergovernmental agreement, however, entities subject to the agreement (including 
Swiss banks) can disclose certain information to the U.S. without violating secrecy laws.  Id.; see Agreement 
Between Switzerland and the United States of America for Cooperation to Facilitate the Implementation of 
FATCA, Art. 2(7), (9), U.S.-Switz., Feb. 14, 2013, available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/treaties/Documents/FATCA-Agreement-Switzerland-2-14-2013.pdf (including “Custodial 
Institutions” within the definition of financial institutions subject to FATCA).  For more on these 
intergovernmental agreements, see infra notes 208–222 and accompanying text. 
49 Shaxon, supra note 42, at 101 ("Fearing that Field would spill his clients’ secrets, exposing the 
Caymans to a major international scandal, an oppressive new secrecy law was drafted, the now infamous 
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does not require its financial institutions to maintain depositor secrecy by law, however, 
it still may lack effective information exchange where, for example, its administrative 
policies or practices do not allow for such exchange, or even where the country is just 
uncooperative with other countries.50 
B. Capital Flight to the United States 
Even though the OECD has laid out criteria to determine whether a country acts 
as a tax haven, its definition is underinclusive.  Most notably, the definitions used to 
classify countries as tax havens "exclude some of the practices of developed countries 
that are OECD members,"51 with the OECD "spell[ing] out a contorted definition of tax 
havens that excluded its own members."52  Among other things, OECD countries have 
preferential tax regimes, exempt certain types of income earned by nonresidents from 
taxation, and refuse to share information with other countries.53  Countries classified as 
tax havens have pointed to this hypocrisy, arguing that "when it comes to secrecy, money 
laundering, and tax fraud," the U.S. and the U.K. represent the most significant 
offenders.54 
The United States has long functioned as a repository for foreign assets.  With 
the repeal of U.S. tax on portfolio interest paid to non-U.S. persons in the 1980s, Latin 
American money began to flow into U.S. bank accounts and other U.S. portfolio 
investments.55  By 2011, about $240 billion of Latin American wealth had found its way 
to the United States, primarily Miami and New York.56  In fact, in 2009 the U.S. topped 
the list of countries that served as homes for private foreign deposits in total dollar 
amount, with nonresidents holding nearly $2.2 trillion in private deposits in the U.S.57  
At first blush, thinking of the United States as a tax haven makes no sense.  
Nonresident alien individuals and entities pay taxes on their U.S. source trade or business 
income at the same marginal rates that apply to U.S. taxpayers.58  Currently the U.S. has 
the highest marginal corporate tax rate of OECD countries, at 35 percent,59 and with a top 
                                                                                                                                                 
Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law, making it a crime punishable by prison to reveal financial or 
banking arrangements in the Caymans."). 
50 OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 34, at 29–30. 
51 Karen B. Brown, Harmful Tax Competition: The OECD View, 32 GEO. WASH.  J. INT'L L. & 
ECON. 311, 315 (1999). 
52 Andrew P. Morriss & Lotta Moberg, Cartelizing Taxes: Understanding the OECD’s Campaign 
against "Harmful Tax Competition", 4 COLUM. J. TAX L. 1, 38 (2012). 
53 See, e.g., Langer, supra note 33, at 1236. 
54 Charles Gnaedinger, U.S., Cayman Islands Debate Tax Haven Status, 123 TAX NOTES 543, 543 
(2009).  See also Langer, supra note 33, at 2832 ("Even worse, most OECD member states are guilty of 
egregious unfair tax competition that is much more serious and harmful than that of which the OECD is 
complaining."). 
55 Avi-Yonah, supra note 20, at 1584–85.  
56 BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, GLOBAL WEALTH 2012: THE BATTLE TO REGAIN STRENGTH 11 
(2012), available at 
https://www.bcgperspectives.com/Images/BCG_The_Battle_to_Regain_Strength_May_2012_tcm80-106998.
pdf.  Moreover, Asian-Pacific residents held $200 billion in the U.S., while residents of the Middle East and 
Africa held another $40 billion in the U.S.  Id. 
57 ANN HOLLINGSHEAD, GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRITY, PRIVATELY-HELD, NON-RESIDENT DEPOSITS 
IN SECRECY JURISDICTIONS 15 (Mar. 2010), available at 
http://www.gfip.org/storage/gfip/documents/reports/gfi_privatelyheld_web.pdf.  The next two largest holders 
of private foreign deposits were the Cayman Islands and the U.K., with about $1.5 trillion each.  Id. 
58 I.R.C. §§ 871(b)(1), 882(a)(1) (2012). 
59 Diana Furchtgott-Roth, Corporate Tax Reform Should Come First, 137 TAX NOTES 901, 902 
(2012). 
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individual marginal rate of 39.6 percent,60  the U.S. seems an unlikely repository for 
foreign tax-evaders.  Moreover, foreign persons are subject to a 30 percent flat tax on 
their U.S. source passive income.61  As such, using the U.S. as a tax haven appears 
downright laughable. 
However, U.S. tax law exempts significant portions of foreigners’ U.S. source 
income from taxation.  For more than ninety years, nonresident aliens and foreign 
corporations have owed no U.S. tax on interest they earn on bank deposits in U.S. 
banks.62  As a result, nonresidents hold hundreds of billions of dollars in U.S. bank 
deposits.63  In addition, nonresident aliens and foreign corporations who receive U.S.-
source "portfolio interest" owe no taxes on that interest,64  even though U.S. persons 
holding the same securities would owe taxes on the interest.65  
Nonresident aliens can also hold U.S. equity securities in their portfolios with 
minimal U.S. tax consequences.  True, a nonresident alien owes a 30 percent tax on her 
dividends from U.S. corporations, 66  but provided she invests for growth rather than 
income, she can essentially eliminate her tax liability.  This is because the Internal 
Revenue Code generally requires a realization event before it will tax asset appreciation, 
so an investor who holds non-dividend-paying U.S. securities as they appreciate pays no 
taxes on that appreciation.67  Moreover, if a nonresident alien chooses to realize that 
income, she will still pay no U.S. taxes.  The tax law sources gains from the sale of 
personal property—including securities—to the residence of the seller. 68   If our 
nonresident alien sells her shares of U.S. securities, then, any gain she realizes will be 
foreign-source gain.  But the U.S. generally only taxes non-resident aliens on their U.S.-
source passive income, ignoring any foreign-source passive income they might have.69 
As a result of the confluence of rules governing the taxation of a foreign person’s 
interest and capital gains, a nonresident alien can invest broadly in the United States 
without subjecting herself to any significant U.S. taxation.  Moreover, the U.S. has 
                                                     
60 I.R.C. § 1(a) (2012). 
61 Id. §§ 871(a), 881. 
62 Id. § 871(i)(1), (2); see also Langer, supra note 33, at 2833 ("Bank deposits held by foreign 
persons have been effectively exempt from U.S. income tax since 1921."). 
63 Langer, supra note 33, at 2833. 
64 I.R.C. § 871(h)(1) (2012).  "Portfolio interest" includes interest on government bonds, notes, 
Treasury bills, and many corporate bonds.  Langer, supra note 33, at 2834. 
65 I.R.C. § 61(a)(4) (2012). 
66 I.R.C. § 871(a)(1)(A) (2012).  Moreover, the paying corporation must withhold this tax from the 
dividend and pay it over to the government.  Id. § 1441(a) (2012).  This ensures that even though the 
recipient of the dividend is outside of the jurisdiction of the United States, the government can collect the tax 
revenue. 
67 See Jeffrey L. Kwall, When Should Asset Appreciation Be Taxed?: The Case for a Disposition 
Standard of Realization, 86 IND. L.J. 77, 79 (2011) ("The U.S. income tax . . . has always embraced a 
realization requirement, thereby deferring the taxation of asset appreciation until the occurrence of a 
realization event . . . .").  The Code has a small handful of situations in which, rather than wait for a 
realization event, taxpayers mark their assets to market. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 475 (mark-to-market mandatory 
for brokers in securities and commodities, elective for traders), 1256 (certain futures and foreign currency 
contracts and certain options marked to market), 1296 (elective mark-to-market for owners of passive foreign 
investment companies). 
68 I.R.C. § 865(a) (2012).  
69 See I.R.C. § 871(a)(1) (2012) (imposing taxes on income received from U.S. sources).  
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effectively ring-fenced these provisions—they do not apply to U.S. citizens or residents, 
who must pay taxes on their worldwide income (including interest and capital gains).70  
The United States resembles non-OECD tax havens in other respects, as well.  
Absent some sort of treaty obligation, the I.R.S. cannot disclose tax information to 
foreign governments.71  Moreover, even if the I.R.S. faced no legal bar on disclosing 
taxpayer information, it could not disclose information that banks do not provide.72  And 
the law only began to obligate banks to report to the I.R.S. their interest payments to 
nonresident alien account holders in 2013.73  That obligation was enacted, moreover, not 
in the interest of increasing transparency, but so that foreign governments would enter 
into information exchange agreements with the U.S. pursuant to the Foreign Account Tax 
Compliance Act.74  
Even with the increased information that the I.R.S. may be able to provide to 
foreign governments, nonresidents still hide assets in the U.S.  In 2009, the Tax Justice 
Network published its first Financial Secrecy Index. 75   The U.S. topped its list of 
secretive jurisdictions, largely because states like Delaware, Florida, Nevada, and 
Wyoming "offer high levels of banking secrecy to non-residents, and have no 
requirement for details of beneficial ownership of corporations and trusts to be placed on 
public record."76 
Finally, even if a foreign government discovered its citizen or resident has assets 
hidden in the United States, either through its own efforts or because of I.R.S. disclosure, 
it has no way to access those assets if the citizen or resident has evaded her taxes.  The 
law of the United States includes the common law revenue rule, which prevents U.S. 
courts from enforcing foreign tax judgments.77 
III. ENFORCING FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN U.S. COURTS 
In general, U.S. courts both recognize and enforce foreign judgments.  Litigants 
who have received a judgment from a foreign court have "little trouble convincing courts 
in the United States to recognize and enforce that judgment."78  The Restatement (Third) 
of Foreign Relations Law explains that, in general, judgments of foreign courts are 
"conclusive between the parties, and [are] entitled to recognition in courts in the United 
                                                     
70 See, e.g., Susan C. Morse, Tax Compliance and Norm Formation Under High-Penalty Regimes, 
44 CONN. L. REV. 675, 702 (2012) ("It is perfectly clear that U.S. citizens and residents must pay U.S. taxes 
on their worldwide income, including income that accrues to an offshore account."). 
71 I.R.C. § 6103(a), (k)(4) (2012); see also Langer, supra note 33, at 2835. 
72 See Letter from Mark J. Mazur, Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy), to Senator Rand Paul (Oct. 10, 
2012), 2012 TAX NOTES TODAY 201-18.  
73 Treas. Reg. § 1.6049-4(b)(5) (2012). 
74 See T.D. 9584, 2012-20 I.R.B. 901 ("These regulations will facilitate intergovernmental 
cooperation on FATCA implementation by better enabling the IRS, in appropriate circumstances, to 
reciprocate by exchanging information with foreign governments for tax administration purposes."); see infra 
notes 208-222 and accompanying text. 
75 John Christensen, The Hidden Trillions: Secrecy, Corruption, and the Offshore Interface, 57 
CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE 325, 329 (2012). 
76 Id.at 335.  Not everybody is sanguine about calling the U.S.—or these particular states—tax 
havens, of course.  See, e.g., Howard M. Liebman, Letter to the Editor, Tax Haven Claim Overstated for U.S. 
States, 54 TAX NOTES INT’L 147, 147 (2009) ("Without wishing at all to cast aspersions on any government 
leader, I think it overstates the case rather seriously to claim that Delaware, Nevada, and Wyoming are tax 
havens."). 
77 See Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349 (2005). 
78 William J. Kovatch, Jr., Recognizing Foreign Tax Judgments: An Argument for the Revocation of 
the Revenue Rule, 22 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 265, 266 (2000). 
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States."79  Even though the judgments of foreign courts are not entitled to full faith and 
credit in the United States, recognizing and enforcing them furthers public policy by 
ensuring an end to litigation.80 
Exceptions exist, of course.  Defendants have a number of defenses against 
recognition that they can present.81  If the defendant demonstrates that the foreign country 
does not have impartial tribunals or procedures that comport with due process, or that the 
foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the defendant, U.S. courts cannot recognize or 
enforce the judgment.82  Moreover, defendants can present additional defenses, including 
that the cause of action or the judgment contravenes U.S. public policy, that give U.S. 
courts the option of not recognizing or enforcing the judgment.83 
State law governs the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, which 
could provide for significant variation, notwithstanding the Restatement, in the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.84  The actual variation, though, is 
slight: all states either follow a common law standard derived from Hilton v. Guyot,85 or 
they have adopted a version of Uniform Act governing the recognition of foreign 
judgments.86  
In Hilton, the Supreme Court established the common law rule that foreign 
judgments can be recognized and enforced by U.S. courts where 
there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad before a court of 
competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon regular proceedings, 
after due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant, and under a 
system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of 
justice between the citizens of its own country and those of other 
countries, and there is nothing to show either prejudice in the court, or in 
the system of laws under which it was sitting, or fraud in procuring the 
judgment, or any other special reason why the comity of this nation 
should not allow it full effect.87 
In addition to these criteria, the Supreme Court held that foreign judgments would only 
be enforced by U.S. courts if the foreign country enforced U.S. judgments; international 
law, it held, "is founded upon mutuality and reciprocity."88  If the foreign judgment met 
these criteria, the merits of the case should not be retried in a U.S. court.89  Rather, absent 
the defendant’s demonstrating that the judgment was unfair, courts generally find foreign 
judgments presumptively valid.90 
                                                     
79 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN REL. L. § 481(1) (1987). 
80 RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 cmt. b (1971). 
81 Id. § 482 cmt. 1. 
82 Id. § 482(1). 
83 Id. § 482(2)(d). 
84 Cedric C. Chao & Christine S. Neuhoff, Enforcement and Recognition of Foreign Judgments in 
United States Courts: A Practical Perspective, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 147, 148 (2001). 
85 159 U.S. 113 (1895). 
86 Chao & Neuhoff, supra note 84, at 148; see infra notes 96-97 and accompanying text. 
87 Hilton, 159 U.S. at 202. 
88 Id. at 228. 
89 Id. at 203. 
90 Chao & Neuhoff, supra note 86, at 149. 
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States that followed the common law often faced a problem, however: foreign 
countries did not always understand that U.S. courts would enforce foreign judgments.91  
If the foreign country did not believe that the state’s courts would enforce foreign 
judgments, it would often refuse to enforce judgments from the state’s courts.92  The 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted the Uniform 
Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act of 1962 (UFMJRA) to respond to this 
concern.  The drafters intended for the UFMJRA to codify the common law, not to 
change it.93  By doing so, they believed, foreign governments would be more likely to 
recognize the judgments of U.S. courts by providing a statutory basis to which foreign 
courts could look in determining whether a state court granted reciprocity.94  More than 
four decades later, the Commissioners drafted the Uniform Foreign-Country Money 
Judgments Recognition Act (UFCMJRA) to update, clarify, and correct problems with 
the UFMJRA.95  Seventeen states, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands have 
enacted some version of the UFMJRA, 96  while seventeen states have adopted the 
UFCMJRA.97  In states that have adopted either of the Uniform Acts, courts treat foreign 
judgments as enforceable, unless the defendant can prove a reason for non-enforcement.98 
As a practical matter, the method of enforcing a foreign judgment is determined 
under state law, and can vary from state to state.99  The Uniform Acts, however, provide 
some sense of order.  The UFMJRA provides that foreign judgments will be enforced in 
the same method as sister-state judgments would be enforced.100  The drafters of the 
UFCMJRA decided to simplify the method even more, writing that a foreign country 
money judgment "is enforceable in the forum state in accordance with the procedures for 
enforcement in the forum state and to the same extent that a judgment of the forum state 
would be enforceable."101  No uniform procedure exists for a successful foreign plaintiff 
                                                     
91 See, e.g., Barbara Kulzer, Recognition of Foreign Country Judgments in New York: The Uniform 
Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, 18 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 1 (1968) ("Their concern has not been so 
much with the substantive law now in force in most of the states but with the comprehension—or lack of it—
of that law on the part of foreign countries."); Adolph Homburger, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments: A New Yorker Reflects on Uniform Acts, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 367, 370 (1970) (the common law 
recognition of foreign judgments "a serious problem of communication between two legal systems, one 
grounded on the doctrine of precedent and the other on the supremacy of code law."). 
92 Ronald A. Brand, Enforcement of Foreign Money-Judgments in the United States: In Search of 
Uniformity and International Acceptance, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 255 (1991) ("In the international 
arena, enforcement of United States judgments overseas is often possible only if the United States court 
rendering the judgment would enforce a similar decision of the foreign enforcing court."). 
93 Kulzer, supra note 91, at 5. 
94 13 U.L.A. (pt. II) 40 (2002). 
95 13 U.L.A. (pt. II) 27 (Supp. 2012). 
96 Id. at 39. 
97 Id. at 18. 
98 UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 3, 13 U.L.A. (pt. II) 49 (2002); UNIF. 
FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(a), 13 U.L.A. (pt. II) 26 (Supp. 2012). 
99 See Robert V. von Mehren, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in the United States, 17 VA. J. 
INT'L L. 401, 404 (1977) ("Consideration of U.S. procedures and remedies available to enforce foreign 
judgments is complicated by the fact that each of the fifty states has its own detailed rules governing these 
matters."). 
100 UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 3, 13 U.L.A. (pt. II) 49 (2002) ("The 
foreign judgment is enforceable in the same manner as the judgment of a sister state which is entitled to full 
faith and credit."). 
101 UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 7 cmt. c, 13 U.L.A. (pt. II) 37 
(Supp. 2013). 
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to have a U.S. court enforce a foreign judgment.102  In many states that have adopted one 
of the Uniform Acts, however, plaintiffs may choose to initiate the enforcement through 
an expedited procedure (such as a motion for summary judgment) rather than filing a 
complaint.103 
IV. THE REVENUE RULE 
One significant exception exists to U.S. courts’ willingness to enforce foreign 
money judgments: tax judgments.  "Under the 'revenue rule,' the courts of the United 
States are under no obligation to recognize or enforce a foreign tax judgment."104  Beyond 
merely having no obligation, though, the revenue rule may in fact prohibit U.S. courts 
from recognizing foreign tax judgments. 105   And codification of the enforcement of 
foreign judgments did not affect the revenue rule; as part of the codification, the 
UFMJRA removed judgments for taxes from its definition of a "foreign judgment,"106 
while the UFCMJRA states that it does not apply to judgments for taxes.107 
A. Roots of the Revenue Rule 
The revenue rule traces its roots to the English common law. In two cases in the 
eighteenth century, Lord Mansfield established in dicta that English courts would not 
enforce foreign tax judgments.  In Holman v. Johnson, a case resolving a contractual 
dispute, Mansfield wrote that "no country ever takes notice of the revenue law of 
another."108  Then, four years later, he held that a ship’s avoiding French customs duties 
did not constitute fraud because "[o]ne nation does not take notice of the revenue laws of 
another."109 
Although originally dicta, the revenue rule continued to play a part in British law 
and, even today, continues to be the law of the United Kingdom.110  Moreover, the United 
States imported the revenue rule as part of its common law.111  Originally, U.S. courts 
applied the revenue rule even to tax judgments from sister states.112  In 1935, though, 
                                                     
102 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN REL. L. § 481 cmt. g (1987). 
103 Id. 
104 Kovatch, supra note 78, at 267. 
105 According to the Restatement, courts’ nonrecognition of foreign tax judgments is permitted, but 
is not required.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN REL. L. § 483 cmt. a.  It is not clear, however, that the 
Restatement is correct; even as the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of the revenue rule in Pasquantino, it 
explained that the revenue rule "prohibited the collection of tax obligations of foreign nations." Pasquantino 
v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 361 (2005). 
106 UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 1(2), 13 U.L.A. (pt. II) 44 (2002). 
107 UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 3(b)(1), 13 U.L.A. (pt. II) 23 
(Supp. 2012). 
108 Holman v. Johnson, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121 (1775). 
109 Planche v. Fletcher, 99 Eng. Rep. 164, 165 (1779). 
110 See generally Brenda Mallinak, The Revenue Rule: A Common Law Doctrine for the Twenty-
First Century, 16 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 79, 89–92 (2006).  
111 Id. at 84 ("State courts adopted the revenue rule as part of the common law heritage inherited 
from England . . . ."). 
112 See, e.g., Henry v. Sargeant, 13 N.H. 321, 331 (1843) ("It is said that the court will not notice 
the penal laws, or the revenue laws, of another state."); State of Colorado v. Harbeck, 133 N.E. 
357, 359 (1921) ("Under the due process clause of the United States Constitution, where the 
delinquents are nonresidents of the taxing state and outside its jurisdiction, so that no personal 
liability or enforceable duty may be established as against them, and where the property involved 
is without the taxing state, so that no res exists upon which the taxing state may impose a lien, the 
state is powerless to collect the tax in its own courts, and powerless to invoke the aid of a sister 
state to collect its revenue."). 
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based on the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court 
eliminated the revenue rule’s prohibition on enforcing tax judgments as between states.113  
In 1979, the Ninth Circuit addressed whether the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Milwaukee also eliminated the revenue rule with respect to foreign governments.  Her 
Majesty the Queen ex rel. British Columbia v. Gilbertson concerned several U.S. citizens 
who engaged in logging in British Columbia.114  The government of British Columbia 
assessed tax on their logging income, and filed a certificate of assessment in the Supreme 
Court of British Columbia.115  This certificate of assessment had the same effect as a final 
judgment under British Columbia law.116 
British Columbia then filed a suit in the United States seeking recognition and 
enforcement of the tax judgment.117  British Columbia argued that the same reasoning 
that overturned the revenue rule between sister states should apply to eliminate the 
revenue rule with respect to tax judgments of foreign governments, too.118  The court 
held, however, that the Constitution contains "no provision similar to the full faith and 
credit clause . . . which would require that the courts of this country extend full faith and 
credit to the judgments of a foreign country."119  As a result of the revenue rule, the court 
held that it could not enforce Canada’s tax judgment.120  
When the Ninth Circuit affirmed the continuing validity of the revenue rule, it 
pointed to both its long history as a part of the law and the valid reasons that originally 
underlay (and continue to underlie) its existence.121  At the same time, it said that if the 
rule were to be changed, that would be the role of the "policy-making branches of our 
government."122  In general, however, the policy-making branches of government have 
made no move toward changing the revenue rule. 123   Congress has not passed any 
legislation that would permit courts to enforce foreign tax judgments.124  
B. The Revenue Rule Today 
Not content with merely passively permitting the revenue rule to continue, in 
several instances, the government has expressly acted to perpetuate it.  The 2006 Model 
Income Tax Convention, for example, does not include any provisions permitting the 
enforcement of tax judgments.125  Likewise, of the United States’ sixty-eight income tax 
                                                     
113 Milwaukee Cnty. v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 279 (1935) ("We conclude that a judgment 
is not to be denied full faith and credit in state and federal courts merely because it is for taxes."). 
114 597 F.2d 1161, 1162 (9th Cir. 1979). 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 1163. 
118 Id.at 1164 n.8. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 1166.  Interestingly, though the court did not rely on reciprocity, it pointed out that 
Canadian law also includes the revenue rule, and Canadian courts have refused to enforce U.S. tax 
judgments.  Id.  
121 Her Majesty the Queen ex rel. British Columbia, 597 F.2d at 1166. 
122 Id. 
123 The United States has embraced five exceptions by treaty.  See infra note 249 and 
accompanying text. 
124 See, e.g., JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAX’N, TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT ISSUES WITH 
RESPECT TO OFFSHORE ACCOUNTS AND ENTITIES 43 (2009) ("Although its vitality and scope have been 
questioned, . . . the [revenue rule] doctrine remains a cornerstone of all common law jurisdictions . . . ."). 
125 Lee A. Sheppard, Will U.S. Hypocrisy on Information Sharing Continue?, 138 TAX NOTES 253, 
254 (2013) ("The U.S. treaty with Canada contains an 'assistance in collection' article, which does not appear 
in the U.S. model treaty, in addition to the standard information exchange article."). 
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treaties currently in force,126 only five include provisions permitting the enforcement of 
foreign tax judgments.127  Moreover, the U.S. originally ratified treaties with four of the 
five countries in the 1930s and 1940s. 128   By the 1950s, the Senate had become 
disillusioned with the collection provisions, and declined to ratify new treaties with 
collection provisions.129 
And the government’s perpetuation of the revenue rule does not limit itself to 
passively perpetuating a model treaty that does not include a collection provision.  In 
1989, the U.S. signed the OECD Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax 
Matters, the first multilateral tax treaty of its kind.130  The Convention includes provisions 
requiring signatories to assist in the collection of taxes on behalf of other signatory 
countries. 131   The United States, however, adopted a reservation to the reciprocal 
collection provisions.132  By adopting this reservation, the United States surrendered its 
ability to require other parties to the treaty to provide assistance in collecting U.S. 
taxes.133  The United States apparently decided, however, that the value of the revenue 
rule outweighed the value of any revenue other countries could help it recover. 
As recently as 2005, the Supreme Court confirmed the continuing viability of the 
revenue rule.  In its decision in Pasquantino v. United States,134 the Supreme Court had to 
determine whether a scheme to defraud the Canadian government of tax revenue violated 
the federal wire fraud statute. 135   While in New York, Carl and David Pasquantino 
ordered liquor from discount stores in Maryland by phone.136  Then, to avoid the heavy 
Canadian excise taxes on imported liquor, they hired others to smuggle the liquor over 
the Canadian border.137  
Though the jury found them guilty, and the Court of Appeals eventually agreed, 
the Pasquantinos claimed that they had not committed wire fraud.138  Because the revenue 
rule prevents the U.S. from "tak[ing] cognizance of the revenue laws of Canada,"139 they 
argued, the wire fraud statute should be construed "to except frauds directed at evading 
                                                     
126 Allison Christians, How Nations Share, 87 IND. L.J. 1407, 1419 (2012). 
127 Attorney Gen. of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 115 (2d Cir. 
2001).  
128 Brenda Mallinak, The Revenue Rule: A Common Law Doctrine for the Twenty-First Century, 16 
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 79, 94 (2006). 
129 Id. at 95. 
130 Marian Nash Leich, U.S. Practice, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 237, 245 (1990). 
131 OECD Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters art. 11, June 28, 1989, 
27 I.L.M. 1160. 
132 136 Cong. Rec. S13,295 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1990) (ratifying convention except "[t]hat the 
United States will not provide assistance in the recovery of any tax claim, or in the recovery of an 
administrative fine, for any tax"); see also Council of Europe Treaty Office, List of declarations made with 
respect to treaty No. 127 (2014), available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.asp?NT=127&CV=1&NA=&PO=999&CN=99
9&VL=1&CM=9&CL=ENG. 
133 See JT. COMM. TAX’N, EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED CONVENTION ON MUTUAL ADMINISTRATIVE 
ASSISTANCE IN TAX MATTERS 22 (1990) ("A party that has made a reservation is not permitted to require 
another party to observe that reserved provision of the convention."). 
134 544 U.S. 349 (2005). 
135 Id. at 353. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 353–54. 
139 Id. at 354. 
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foreign taxes."140  They failed, however, to convince the Supreme Court, which found 
that the case law did not establish that the revenue rule barred the United States from 
punishing criminal conduct, even where an element of that conduct is failure to pay taxes 
to a foreign country.141  This was not, the Court held, "a suit that recovers a foreign tax 
liability, like a suit to enforce a judgment."142  Because this was a criminal prosecution, 
and not an attempt to enforce a foreign tax judgment, the revenue rule did not apply here. 
Although the Supreme Court confirmed that the revenue rule still prevents U.S. 
courts from enforcing foreign tax judgments, it also limited the scope of the revenue rule.  
The Pasquantinos argued not only that an attempt to defraud a foreign government of tax 
revenue could not support a wire fraud conviction, but that their prosecution did, in fact, 
enforce Canada’s tax judgment.  If the Court upheld their conviction, they pointed out, 
the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996143 would require them to pay the lost tax 
revenue to Canada.144  Effectively, then, by convicting them of wire fraud, the U.S. also 
aided Canada in its collection of tax revenue, in derogation of the revenue rule.  
While the Supreme Court acknowledged that the Pasquantinos would have to pay 
to Canada the tax liability they had attempted to evade, the Court did "not think it matters 
whether the provision of restitution is mandatory in the prosecution."145  The purpose of 
the restitution requirement was to "mete out appropriate criminal punishment," 146  a 
purpose not at odds with the revenue rule.  Under Pasquantino, it appears that U.S. courts 
have the ability to aid foreign governments with their collection of taxes provided such 
collection is merely a secondary result of permissible judicial action. 
C. Rationales for the Revenue Rule 
The rationale proffered to justify the revenue rule has changed significantly since 
its inception.  Originally, courts used the revenue rule to diminish "the commercial 
disruption caused by the high tariffs" of the eighteenth century.147  By the middle of the 
twentieth century, though, the rationales for the revenue rule had shifted.  In its modern 
form, commentators explain that the revenue rule principally works to prevent "judicial 
evaluation of the policy-laden enactments of other sovereigns,"148 avoid giving domestic 
effect to the foreign policies embodied in revenue laws,149 and avoid forcing courts to 
evaluate the validity of foreign tax regimes, an inquiry that U.S. courts understandably 
lack competence to perform.150  Essentially, the principal current justification for the 
revenue rule is that not enforcing foreign judgments prevents U.S. courts from impinging 
on foreign countries’ sovereignty by reviewing their revenue laws.151 
                                                     
140 Id. at 359. 
141 Id. at 362. 
142 Id. 
143 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663A-3664 (2012). 
144 Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 365. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
147 Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 407, 366 (2005). 
148 Id. at 368. 
149 Id. at 369. 
150 Id. at 370. 
151 See, e.g., Mallinak, supra note 110, at 123–24 ("The concern that underlies, at least in part, the 
revenue rule is that courts are reluctant to engage in evaluation of another state’s decision to raise revenue in 
any particular way or to discourage or encourage behavior through social engineering in the tax system."); 
Kovatch, supra note 78, at 277 ("The justification for the revenue rule, as stated by Judge Learned Hand, is to 
avoid the examination of the revenue laws and policies of other nations by U.S. courts."); Richard E. Smith, 
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This justification rings hollow, though.  In non-revenue contexts, U.S. courts 
routinely evaluate foreign judgments, and then enforce them or refuse to enforce them.152  
In enforcing foreign judgments, U.S. courts must make judgments about the enforcement 
of or policies underlying foreign law.  
If a foreign plaintiff asks a U.S. court to recognize and enforce a foreign 
judgment other than a tax or a penal judgment, the court can and does evaluate, among 
other things, the fairness of the tribunal and whether the cause of action on which the 
plaintiff won the judgment violates U.S. public policy. 153   Neither courts nor 
commentators, in laying out the justification for the revenue rule, have explained why 
evaluating foreign revenue laws is more sensitive than, for example, evaluating foreign 
contract law or a foreign court’s fairness.  Whether the U.S. court looks at revenue laws 
or other laws or procedures, should it decline to enforce the judgment, the U.S. court 
impinges on the sovereignty of the foreign country. 
And U.S. courts do, where appropriate, refuse to enforce foreign judgments, even 
where such refusal challenges a foreign country’s sovereignty.  In Bank Melli Iran v. 
Pahlavi,154 for example, Pahlavi, the sister of the former Shah of Iran, had signed a 
number of promissory notes held by two Iranian banks.155  As a result of the Iranian 
revolution, the Shah and his family fled Iran; the banks brought collection actions against 
Pahlavi in Iranian courts.156  The banks obtained default judgments of $32 million against 
her and sought to enforce those judgments under the California Uniform Foreign Money-
Judgments Recognition Act.157  Pahlavi filed a motion to dismiss, claiming the courts had 
not provided for due process of law.158  The Court of Appeals found the Iranian courts’ 
judgments deficient: "Pahlavi could not expect fair treatment from the courts of Iran, 
could not personally appear before those courts, could not obtain proper legal 
representation in Iran, and could not even obtain local witnesses on her behalf." 159  
Because the Iranian justice system lacked even the most rudimentary due process, U.S. 
courts would not enforce the judgment.160 
Moreover, U.S. courts do not limit their careful scrutiny to judgments emanating 
from hostile states.161  Even defendants from our allies can raise affirmative defenses to 
final judgments from their home countries. Recently, U.S. courts have refused to 
recognize and enforce several final judgments from Mexican courts.162  In one, Pegaso 
                                                                                                                                                 
Note, The Nonrecognition of Foreign Tax Judgments: International Tax Evasion, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 241, 
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sued Bell Helicopter for breach of contract in Mexico City Civil Court. 163   Pegaso 
ultimately won, and both companies provided the Mexican trial court with expert damage 
reports.164  The experts’ damages calculations differed by more than $10 million, though, 
so the judge appointed an independent expert.165  Bell claimed that the judge did not 
follow Mexican law in selecting the independent expert, and that the expert solicited a 
bribe from Bell.166  When Bell refused to pay the bribe, the expert issued a report finding 
damages that exceeded even those calculated by Pegaso’s expert.167  The Delaware court 
found that it could not enforce the Mexican judgment, inasmuch as the evidence indicated 
it had been fraudulently obtained, with both the judge and the expert acting illegally.168 
In a second Mexican judgment involving judicial fraud, U.S. courts also refused 
to enforce the foreign final judgment. 169  Richard Greene and John Robert Burke started 
a restaurant and cantina in Cabo San Lucas, Mexico.170  The business soon ran into 
trouble, and Burke allegedly signed an I.O.U. for $250,000.171  Greene eventually filed a 
lawsuit in the Court of First Instance in Cabo San Lucas, and, Burke alleged, he bribed 
the judge to enter the I.O.U. into the court system without informing Burke.172  By the 
time a U.S. court was asked to enforce the judgment, evidence existed indicating that not 
only had Green bribed the judge, but later the judge had become Greene’s attorney.173  
Moreover, the settlement agreement had other serious problems.174  As a result, the U.S. 
court held that the judgment was "so deficient—or to use Judge Blackburn’s term, 
'riddled'—with questionable features, irregular court proceedings, disputed legitimacy 
and contested translations, an absence of due process and, yes, evident fraud, that the 
Court cannot conclude that [it is] valid, legitimate or that [it] should not be set aside."175 
In each of these cases, a U.S. court judged whether a foreign court’s decision 
resulted from a fair process.  In determining that the judges had acted fraudulently and 
that defendants had not received due process, the U.S. courts judged the actions of 
foreign government actors.  Notwithstanding the sovereignty of these foreign nations, the 
U.S. courts decided not to recognize and enforce their final judgments.  There is no 
reason to think that U.S. courts would not similarly exercise such judgments when asked 
to enforce foreign revenue claims.  The sovereignty justification for the revenue rule thus 
appears to fall flat. 
V. A FRAMEWORK FOR REVOCATION: POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
As discussed above, the revenue rule does not present the sole, or perhaps even 
the most significant, obstacle to foreign governments’ preventing tax evasion by their 
citizens and residents.  Why, then, do I advocate eliminating the revenue rule, rather than 
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tackling these other problems?  Primarily because there are justifications for the other 
rules, or federalism impediments to reforming them.  The justifications for the initial 
creation of the revenue rule, on the other hand, no longer have the same relevance in 
today’s economy, and the federal government could statutorily eliminate the revenue 
rule.  Moreover, the fact that the United States has effectively eliminated the revenue rule 
in five treaties indicates that, notwithstanding its common law pedigree and age, the 
revenue rule is not an irrevocable piece of U.S. law.  
A. Other Potential Reforms, While Meritorious, Are Less Achievable 
Congress could, if it desired, repeal the various exclusions for interest income 
received by nonresident aliens.  Such a repeal seems unlikely, though.  Interest on bank 
deposits has been exempt in the hands of nonresident aliens for a long time, in spite of 
attempts to repeal it.  The reasoning behind the exemptions—to facilitate the flow of 
foreign funds into the U.S.—seems as relevant today as it has been in the past.  
Moreover, Congress has expanded, rather than contracted, the types of interest income 
exempt from U.S. taxation. 
More than ninety years ago, Congress exempted nonresident aliens from paying 
taxes on bank deposit interest they received.176  The Revenue Act of 1921177 exempted 
nonresident aliens from paying taxes on interest earned from U.S. bank deposits to 
"encourage deposits in American banks by nonresident aliens." 178   The Treasury 
Department testified that these deposits were often related to business transactions, and 
that exempting the interest would aid foreign and international trade. 179   By 1966, 
Congress decided to repeal this exemption, questioning whether interest paid to 
nonresident aliens on U.S. bank deposits, "which is so clearly derived from U.S. sources, 
should . . . escape U.S. taxation."180  Recognizing that repealing this exclusion could 
affect the amount of foreign direct investment in the U.S., however, Congress delayed the 
implementation of the repeal.181  Ultimately, instead of going through with the repeal, 
Congress chose to make the exemption for bank deposit interest permanent, 182 
presumably after "considering the impact that the removal of this exemption would have 
on the balance-of-payments."183 
Moreover, in 1984, Congress expanded the types of U.S.-source interest 
nonresident aliens could receive tax-free by enacting the portfolio interest rules.184  The 
portfolio interest rules exempt nonresident aliens from tax on certain U.S.-source interest 
income they receive. 185   Congress passed these rules to facilitate U.S. companies’ 
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borrowing from foreign lenders on the Eurobond market.186  Because borrowers on the 
Eurobond market must pay interest net of taxes, U.S. borrowers would have to pay 
interest and, in addition, taxes, raising their borrowing costs.187  To avoid these additional 
borrowing costs, U.S. corporations formed offshore finance subsidiaries to borrow 
without facing U.S. withholding taxes.188  Concerned that taxing portfolio interest paid to 
nonresident aliens would impair the flow of foreign money to U.S. businesses, Congress 
chose to exempt it instead.189 
Congress has had the chance to impose taxes on U.S.-source interest flowing to 
nonresident aliens.  Not only has it decided to keep the exemption, it eventually expanded 
the types of interest exempt from U.S. taxation.  Congress’s actions demonstrate its belief 
that reducing the tax burden on foreigners increases the inflow of foreign money to U.S. 
borrowers and banks, and that receiving foreign portfolio investment is desirable.  
Because the justification for exempting interest paid to foreigners from taxation has 
proven durable and convincing, Congress is unlikely to change it solely to prevent tax 
evasion by foreign persons.  This aspect of the U.S. tax system is therefore likely to 
continue to be attractive for foreigners who want to hide their assets from their 
governments. 
Congress is also unlikely to eliminate the secrecy available to the owners of 
business entities in some states.  In the United States, state governments, rather than the 
federal government, provide the bulk of regulation of business entities.190  And states 
have 'strong interests in regulating their corporations' internal affairs." 191   Since the 
1930s, scholars have debated whether state-regulated corporation law leads to a race to 
the bottom or to the top,192 but, either way, states, and not the federal government, have 
controlled how much a non-publicly-traded business entity must disclose about its 
ownership structure.193  The federal government is unlikely to try to overrule state laws to 
help foreign governments discover tax evaders. 
Unlike the preceding issues, the federal government can easily overrule the 
revenue rule.  All Congress needs to do is pass a law permitting (or requiring) courts to 
enforce foreign governments’ tax judgments; statutory law "displaces any conflicting 
common law rules."194  Not only can the U.S. overrule the revenue rule: it has done so in 
a handful of situations.  Eliminating the revenue rule would do no harm to the United 
States.  In fact, it could actually assist the I.R.S. in collecting taxes from United States 
taxpayers hiding assets in foreign countries. 
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B. Reciprocity and Revocation 
That the U.S. could revoke the revenue rule does not mean that it will.  It has had 
openings to do so in the past and, with the exception of the U.S.-Canada income tax 
treaty, has chosen not to.  If the revenue rule went away, some portion of the foreigners 
hiding their assets from their home governments would move those assets to another 
country that provided secrecy, low taxes, and that would not enforce foreign judgments.  
To keep foreign investment, would seem to entail a race to the bottom, with every 
country (the United States included) trying to offer a better tax package to attract foreign 
investment.195  
Even if capital-importing countries engage in a race to the bottom, though, the 
U.S. should not, as a normative matter, permit foreigners to use it as a tax haven.196  
Although each country fundamentally and necessarily exercises sovereignty over its own 
tax system, the OECD, in its attempts to control harmful tax competition, has begun to 
articulate in implied international social contract.197  Under this implied social contract, 
countries have the responsibility of "creating a level playing field for all countries."198  To 
the extent that the U.S. works to attract foreign investment by undercutting other 
countries’ tax regimes, the U.S. violates this implied social contract. 
But justifying the repeal of the revenue rule need not rest solely on the United 
States altruistically following an implied international norm.  Abolishing the revenue rule 
could provide tangible benefits to the United States.  In determining whether it will 
enforce another country’s non-revenue judgments, courts often look at whether the other 
country would reciprocally enforce its judgments.199  If the United States revoked the 
revenue rule and began to enforce foreign countries’ tax judgments, other countries 
would potentially reciprocate, enforcing U.S. tax judgments against assets in those 
countries. 
Reciprocity is neither necessary nor sufficient, of course, to cause other countries 
to enforce U.S. tax judgments.  British common law, for example, does not require 
reciprocity for courts to enforce foreign judgments.200  Likewise, in the United States, it 
appears that reciprocity is not absolutely necessary. 201   Even though reciprocity is 
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unnecessary in the U.S., however, courts still evaluate whether the foreign country would 
reciprocate, at least in the revenue context.202  Moreover, even if the United States and 
Britain do not require reciprocity, many countries do require it before they will enforce 
foreign judgments.203 
If the U.S. decided to revoke the revenue rule through treaties, rather than 
through a change in domestic law, reciprocity would assume a central role in the 
revocation.  The terms of bilateral income tax treaties are reciprocal, at least formally.204  
If the U.S. agreed to enforce a treaty partner’s tax judgments, that treaty partner would 
simultaneously agree to enforce U.S. tax judgments.  The multilateral treaty context 
illustrates even more strongly the centrality of reciprocity.  The OECD Convention on 
Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters expressly allows for signatories to take 
a reservation to the mutual enforcement provisions. 205   If a country makes such a 
reservation, however, it cannot require other signatories to enforce its tax judgments, 
even if they took no such reservation.206 
Moreover, recent history indicates that even a unilateral decision by the United 
States to enforce foreign tax judgments could affect significant worldwide change.  In 
2010, in the wake of the UBS tax-evasion scandal, Congress passed the Foreign Account 
Tax Compliance Act (“FATCA”).207  FATCA requires foreign financial institutions to 
report information about accounts held by U.S. persons and about foreign entities with 
significant U.S. ownership.208  The reportable information includes, among other things, 
identifying information about the owner of the account and the balance of the account.209  
Foreign financial institutions that failed to make the disclosures required under FATCA 
would face a 30 percent withholding on certain payments from withholding agents.210 
The United States indicated that it could, by virtue of the coercive value of 
FATCA’s withholding provisions, use FATCA to obtain information about hidden 
foreign accounts unilaterally. 211   Rather than asking foreign governments to share 
information, the U.S. would leverage "the combined weight of U.S. financial markets and 
financial institutions that must, as a practical matter, do business in the U.S. marketplace" 
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to force compliance.212  But even as the U.S. implemented FATCA, it appears to have 
understood the problematic nature of such unilateral action.213  
In mid-2012, Emily McMahon, Acting Treasury Assistant Secretary for Tax 
Policy, acknowledged that complying with FATCA could conflict with some countries’ 
laws, including laws prohibiting financial institutions from disclosing information about 
account holders. 214   The U.S. could resolve these problems by entering into 
intergovernmental agreements.215  The United States, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and 
the United Kingdom issued a joint statement proposing an alternative, and less 
problematic, framework. 216   Instead of each foreign financial institution providing 
information directly to the U.S., a country could enter into an agreement in which its 
financial institutions would report the required information to their government, which 
would, in automatically provide that information to the I.R.S.217  The U.S. would provide 
reciprocal promises to its partner countries.218 
And this bilateral approach to FATCA appears to be working: the U.S. has held 
discussions about intergovernmental FATCA agreements with more than seventy-five 
countries.219  These discussions have resulted in nine agreements so far.220  What began 
as a unilateral move by the United States to address tax evasion by U.S. persons is 
transforming into a multilateral attempt to disclose hidden financial accounts. 221  
Similarly, by revoking the revenue rule, either unilaterally or through bilateral or 
multilateral treaties, the U.S. could encourage other countries to likewise enforce foreign 
tax judgments.  Providing developing economies with the ability to satisfy their tax 
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judgments with assets held offshore will help them develop the tax-collection 
infrastructure they need to truly become independent of foreign assistance. 
C. Economic Imperialism 
Although recognizing and enforcing any foreign judgments risks evaluating 
foreign legal regimes, and thus impinging on foreign sovereignty, refusing to enforce 
revenue judgments also arguably prevents economic imperialism by the United States.  
Repealing the revenue rule would risk economic imperialism if it pressured developing 
countries to enact tax regime that conformed with U.S. standards.  And foreign 
countries—especially developing countries—would risk feeling this pressure if they 
believed that the U.S. would enforce their tax judgments, but only if they enacted a U.S.-
style income tax.  If they believed that U.S. courts would refuse to enforce tax laws that 
differ to radically from the U.S. tax regime, or that are not based on U.S. conceptions of 
tax fairness, developing economies would face significant pressure to design tax systems 
that look like the U.S.’s, even where they would prefer to impose tax in a different 
manner. 
The risk of large economies forcing smaller economies to adopt specific tax 
regimes is very real.  In an explicit example of economic imperialism, the OECD has 
attempted to force tax havens to adopt specific tax policies.222  At the same time, policies 
that may not intend to force foreign countries to adopt (or reject) certain taxes may, 
nonetheless, impose a developed country’s tax preferences on a developing country.  The 
United States, for example, allows taxpayers to take a credit for income, war profits, and 
excess profits taxes they pay to foreign governments.223  To qualify as a creditable tax, 
however, the foreign tax’s "predominant character" must be "that of an income tax in the 
U.S. sense."224  Empirical evidence indicates that non-creditable taxes have a significant 
impact on foreign direct investment in a country.225  Effectively, then, capital-importing 
countries that want U.S. persons to invest in their domestic industries face some pressure 
to enact income taxes in the U.S. sense in place of these non-creditable taxes, even if they 
would prefer to raise revenue in a different manner.  
Moreover, the U.S.’s ability to discriminate against specific tax regimes by 
finding that they do not have the predominant character of a U.S. income tax is not just 
hypothetical.  Historically, many Latin American countries have imposed so-called 
"soak-up" taxes.226  But under the Treasury regulations, soak-up taxes—that is, taxes 
where the amount due is determined by reference to the maximum foreign tax credit a 
taxpayer can receive—do not qualify as income taxes in the U.S. sense.227  U.S. taxpayers 
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cannot, therefore, credit soak-up taxes against their U.S. tax liability.  This creates a real 
dilemma for developing countries in designing their tax regimes.  In Costa Rica, for 
example, a significant portion of the economy relies on U.S. investment.228  In 1972, 
Costa Rica enacted a soak-up provision permitting its tax administrator to exempt a 
foreign taxpayer from paying all or part of her Costa Rican taxes if she could demonstrate 
that she did not get a foreign tax credit in her home country.229  The exemption was rarely 
invoked, however.230  Nonetheless, in 2003, the I.R.S. announced that the Costa Rican 
withholding tax was a soak-up tax, and thus ineligible for the foreign tax credit.231  As a 
result, the Costa Rican tax administration issued a ruling amending its tax law. 232  
Because Costa Rica needed U.S. investment, it yielded to the U.S.’s vision of appropriate 
taxes at the expense of its preferred tax regime. 
A developing country would be justified in reading the U.S. position on soak-up 
taxes as applying more broadly than to just the foreign tax credit.  In those rare occasions 
where the U.S. has abrogated the revenue rule, one factor it has considered has been the 
structure of the foreign country’s tax.  For example, when the United States and Canada 
decided to include a collection assistance provision in their tax treaty,233 the government 
"carefully considered whether and to what extent extraterritorial tax enforcement was 
advisable."234  The negotiators found the similarities between U.S. and Canadian tax laws 
and procedures "of critical importance." 235   A developing country could logically 
conclude, reading this explanation, that if it wanted the U.S. to recognize and enforce its 
tax judgments, it, too, should enact an income tax patterned after the U.S. federal income 
tax. 
Limiting taxpayers to taking a foreign tax credit for U.S.-style income taxes paid 
to foreign governments may make sense; the foreign tax credit exists to prevent taxpayers 
from paying tax on the same income twice.236  Paying a non-income tax—a sales or 
property tax, for example—to a foreign government and income tax to the U.S. 
government does not cause a taxpayer to pay taxes on the same income twice, and thus 
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provides no reason to allow a foreign tax credit for non-income taxes.  And yet even this 
provision puts pressure on developing countries to eliminating non-conforming taxes.  
If developing countries believed that the U.S. would only recognize and enforce 
their tax judgments if their tax systems mimicked the U.S. tax system, they would 
presumably feel significant pressure to enact a U.S.-style tax system.  To prevent such 
economic imperialism, any revocation of the revenue rule would have to make clear, in a 
convincing manner, that U.S. courts’ willingness to recognize and enforce foreign tax 
judgments would not be predicated on the foreign country having a familiar tax 
system.237 
D. U.S. Citizens and the End of the Revenue Rule 
Congress’s principal objection to revoking the revenue rule seems to lie in an 
aversion to enforcing tax judgments against U.S. citizens.  Even in the five treaties in 
which the U.S. has agreed to abrogate the revenue rule, the United States generally will 
not aid in the collection of taxes owed by U.S. citizens and certain corporate residents.238  
When the United States considered ratifying the Convention on Mutual Administrative 
Assistance in Tax Matters, the Joint Committee on Taxation noted that some people 
argued that a reservation on the issue of enforcing foreign tax judgments "[was] 
appropriate, in that the United States should not be obligated to help all the potential 
signatory governments of the convention collect their uncontested tax claims against U.S. 
residents or to collect their claims against their own residents."239  
The Joint Committee on Taxation failed to explain why, however, the United 
States should not help collect tax claims against U.S. citizens and residents.  Provided the 
foreign country imposes the tax in a fair manner and uses a fair judicial process to come 
to the final judgment, there is no compelling policy reason to refuse to enforce the tax 
judgment.  When courts enforce non-revenue judgments, they do not differentiate 
between citizen-defendants and non-citizen defendants.  To the extent a U.S. citizen 
earned income reasonably taxable by a foreign country, there is no reason why she should 
not pay that tax.  
Moreover, the United States does not protect its citizens from foreign tax 
obligations.  When a U.S. person earns income taxable by a foreign country, nothing in 
                                                     
237 For a discussion of how the law could fairly and non-coercively evaluate unfamiliar tax regimes, 
see infra Section Error! Reference source not found..Error! Reference source not found.. 
238 Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with 
respect to taxes on income and capital, U.S.-Fr., art. 28(5), Aug. 31, 1994, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-32 ("The 
assistance provided for in this Article shall not be accorded with respect to citizens, companies, or other 
entities of the Contracting State to which application is made . . . ."); Convention for the avoidance of double 
taxation and the preservation of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income, U.S.-Den., art. 27(8)(a), Aug. 
19, 1999, T.I.A.S. No. 13,056 (no assistance "where the taxpayer is an individual, the revenue claim relates to 
a taxable period in which the taxpayer was a citizen of the requested State"); Convention for the avoidance of 
double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income, with exchanges and 
notes, U.S.-Neth., art. 31(4), Dec. 18, 1992, 2291 U.N.T.S. 3 ("The assistance provided for in this Article 
shall not be accorded with respect to the citizen, corporations, or other entities of the State to which 
application is made . . . ."); Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal 
evasion with respect to taxes on income, U.S.-Swed., art. 27(4), Sept. 1, 1994 ("The assistance provided for 
in this Article shall not be accorded with respect to the citizens, companies, or other entities of the State to 
which the application is made . . . .); Convention with respect to taxes on income and capital, U.S.-Can., art. 
XXVI A(8)(a), Sept. 26, 1980, T.I.A.S. 11,087 (no assistance "[w]here the taxpayer is an individual, the 
revenue claim relates to a taxable period in which the taxpayer was a citizen of the requested State."). 
239 JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAX’N, EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED CONVENTION ON MUTUAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANCE IN TAX MATTERS 8 (1990). 
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U.S. law waives her obligation to pay taxes on that income.  Even tax treaties, which 
work to limit the double taxation of the same income, acknowledge that a foreign country 
can tax a U.S. person in certain circumstances.240  Provided the U.S. person acted in a 
way that subjected her to the jurisdiction of the foreign tax law, she owes the foreign 
taxes. 
Although the U.S. does not shield its citizens from paying foreign taxes, the U.S. 
does have revenue reasons to prefer not to enforce foreign tax judgments against 
residents.  The U.S. allows taxpayers to apply a credit against their U.S. taxes in the 
amount of foreign taxes they pay.241   To the extent the U.S. enforced a foreign tax 
judgment, then, the taxes the U.S. collected on behalf of the foreign sovereign would 
reduce U.S. revenue dollar for dollar.242  Because the foreign tax credit would reduce 
U.S. revenue, enforcing a foreign tax judgment against a U.S. citizen or resident would 
cost the U.S. government money.  As such, even as it repeals the revenue rule, the U.S. 
may have a legitimate incentive to carve out of its enforcement obligation taxes owed by 
citizens.243  
VI. A FRAMEWORK FOR REVOCATION: ADMINISTRATIVE 
CONSIDERATIONS 
A. Judicial Inquiries 
To avoid economic imperialism, any repeal of the revenue rule would need to 
cabin the inquiries U.S. courts can make.  Specifically, courts being asked to recognize 
and enforce foreign tax judgments must be limited to two inquiries.  First, they can look 
at the fairness of the judicial procedure in the foreign country.  If the procedure would not 
qualify for enforcement under the current common law or the applicable Uniform Act, it 
should not qualify in the revenue context. 
Second, courts should have the ability to look at the actual imposition of the tax.  
In general, the United States should not make judgments about foreign tax systems.  
Defendants should, however, have the ability to demonstrate that the tax was targeted 
specifically at them, rather than being generally applicable.  If the tax captured a small 
group of people for a purpose contrary to U.S. public policy and one without a revenue 
explanation (e.g., because of their political beliefs, rather than because of their level of 
income or their business organization), a U.S. court should be able to decline to enforce 
the tax judgment. 
B. Using Treaties to Revoke the Revenue Rule 
Treaties represent a natural starting point for revoking the revenue rule.  The 
United States is a signatory of the OECD Convention on Mutual Administrative 
Assistance in Tax Matters,244 which provides for mutual assistance in collecting taxes.245  
More than sixty countries, including a number of developing economies in Latin America 
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and Africa, have either signed the convention or stated their intention to sign the 
convention.246  If the United States eliminated its reservation, it would, through a single 
action, eliminate the revenue rule with respect to all of the countries that had signed the 
OECD Convention.  And, as an additional benefit, the United States would enjoy a 
network of countries willing to enforce its tax judgments.  
Alternatively, the United States could revoke the revenue rule on an 
individualized basis through bilateral tax treaties.  Models exist for how to draft such a 
provision.  The OECD model tax treaty includes a provision requiring mutual assistance 
in enforcing revenue claims.247  Moreover, even without the OECD model, the United 
States already has five tax treaties—with France, Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, and 
Canada—that provide for assistance in collecting taxes.248  These five treaties use similar 
language; that language could serve as a model for further revoking the revenue rule on a 
country-by-country basis.249 
And the U.S. government may be more comfortable addressing the revenue rule 
on a country-by-country basis.  A protocol to the U.S.-Canada tax treaty providing for the 
mutual enforcement of tax judgments entered into effect in 1995,250 shortly after the 
U.S.’s 1991 ratification of the OECD Convention.251  In contrast to its reservation in the 
Convention, the U.S.-Canada tax treaty provided for mutual enforcement of tax 
judgments.252  The Joint Committee on Taxation explained that the reservation may have 
been appropriate in the context of a multilateral agreement.253  In the context of a bilateral 
treaty, on the other hand, the United States can evaluate the other country’s taxes, both 
                                                     
246 See Status of the Convention, supra note 244. 
247 OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital art. 27 (2010) ("The Contracting 
States shall lend assistance to each other in the collection of revenue claims.').  Moreover, looking to the 
OECD model treaty makes sense; though the U.S. has its own model tax treaty, it has based various of its 
treaties on OECD tax treaties.  See Nat. Westminster Bank, PLC v. United States, 512 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008) ("The 'entire context' of the 1975 Treaty is informed by, and is based on, the Office of Economic 
Cooperation and Development’s . . . 1963 Draft Double Taxation Convention on Income and Capital.”). 
248 Attorney Gen. of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 116 n.11 (2d 
Cir. 2001).  The United States signed treaties with the first four of these countries in the 1930s and 1940s; by 
the end of the 1940s, the Senate "sought to limit the extent to which United States courts and agencies would 
be obligated to render foreign tax collection assistance."  Id. at 116. 
249 U.S.-France Income Tax Treaty art. 28, supra note 238 (“The Contracting States undertake to 
lend assistance and support to each other in the collection of the taxes to which this Convention applies . . . in 
cases where the taxes are definitively due according to the laws of the State making the application.”);  U.S.-
Denmark Income Tax Treaty art. 27, supra note 238 (“The Contracting States undertake to lend assistance to 
each other in the collection of taxes referred to in Article 2 (Taxes Covered), together with interest, costs, 
additions to such taxes, and civil penalties, referred to in this Article as a ‘revenue claim.’”); U.S.-
Netherlands Income Tax Treaty art. 31, supra note 238 (“The States undertake to lend assistance and support 
to each other in the collection of the taxes which are the subject of the present Convention, together with 
interest, costs, and additions to the taxes and fines not being of a penal character.”);U.S.-Sweden Income Tax 
Treaty art. 27, supra note 238 (“The Contracting States undertake to lend assistance and support to each other 
in the collection of the taxes to which this Convention applies, together with interest, costs, and additions to 
such taxes.”); U.S.-Canada Income Tax Treaty art. XXVIA A, supra note 238 (“The Contracting States 
undertake to lend assistance to each other in the collection of taxes referred to in paragraph 9, together with 
interest, costs, additions to such taxes and civil penalties, referred to in this Article as a ‘revenue claim’.”). 
250 Attorney Gen of Canada, 268 F.3d at 119. 
251 Benjamin Berk, et al., United States Activities Of Foreigners And Tax Treaties, 45 TAX LAW. 
1391, 1393 (1992). 
252 U.S.-Canada Income Tax Treaty art. XXVI A, supra note 238. 
253 JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAX’N, EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED PROTOCOL TO THE INCOME TAX 
TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 42–43 (1995). 
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substantively and from a procedural perspective, as well as evaluating broader policy 
issues.254 
Renegotiating its existing treaties would require a significant investment of time 
and effort by the United States.  Still, such renegotiation is at least possible. 255  
Renegotiating income tax treaties would not significantly help developing countries 
establish their revenue systems, however, unless the United States had treaties with 
developing countries.  And, by and large, the United States does not.256  Of the roughly 
62 countries with which the United States has entered into tax treaties, only 16 are 
developing countries.257  This lack of tax treaties with developing countries does not 
result solely from the United States’ lack of interest in such treaties.258  Structurally, 
though, tax treaties generally give preference to the residence country’s tax claim.259  
Countries that export capital and services in roughly similar amounts believe their 
revenue losses under the treaty will be roughly equivalent to their revenue gains.260  
Developing countries, however, tend to be net capital importers, and thus the 
source, rather than the residence, countries.261  Inducing them to enter into a treaty often 
requires concessions that either decrease the treaty’s ability to eliminate double taxation 
(the primary goal of treaties)262 or reduces revenue for the United States without the 
reciprocal increase that developed countries generally expect from their treaties.263  As 
such, as long as the United States will only relinquish the revenue rule as part of a 
bilateral income tax treaty, the revenue rule will continue to impede developing 
countries’ requests that the U.S. enforce their tax judgments.264 
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C. Jurisdictional Issues 
Even with the revenue rule out of the way, a foreign government may face some 
impediments in its enforcement of foreign tax judgments.  In the first instance, the 
foreign country would need to determine the forum in which it sought recognition and 
enforcement.  In the second instance, it would need to demonstrate that the court it chose 
had jurisdiction to hear its claim. 
A foreign country could request enforcement of its tax judgments in state courts 
or, in most cases, in federal courts.265  To sustain the case in federal court would require 
either diversity jurisdiction or federal question jurisdiction. 266   Diversity jurisdiction 
requires that the defendant be a citizen of a state and that the amount of the tax judgment 
exceed $75,000.267  Federal question jurisdiction, on the other hand, would require that 
federal law or a treaty provide for the enforcement of foreign tax judgments.268 
Either way, absent the revenue rule, U.S. courts would clearly have jurisdiction if 
the defendant were a U.S. citizen or resident who had not paid her foreign taxes.  Until 
now, however, even where the U.S. has agreed to enforce another country’s tax 
judgments, it has not agreed to enforce those judgments against U.S. citizens.269  The 
United States’ continued refusal to enforce judgments against U.S. citizens would not 
matter, even in federal courts, if states chose to revoke the revenue rule—in recognizing 
foreign judgments, most courts have held, a federal court looks to state law.270 
If foreign governments could only collect tax judgments from U.S. citizens and 
residents, though, revoking the revenue rule would provide little help to developing 
countries.  In the more common case, the defendant will be a nonresident hiding assets in 
the U.S.  Where the defendant is neither a citizen nor a resident of a state, the question of 
jurisdiction becomes significantly more difficult.  The foreign country could probably not 
avail itself of diversity jurisdiction, because diversity jurisdiction requires that, where the 
plaintiff is a foreign country, the defendant be a "citizen[] of a State."271 
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For a court to have personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the Supreme Court 
does not require that the defendant be present within the jurisdiction. 272   She must, 
however, "have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit 
does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'"273  In the end, the 
defendant must "purposefully avail" herself of the jurisdiction before a court can exercise 
personal jurisdiction over her.274  The personal jurisdiction requirement would appear to 
significantly impede a foreign government’s ability to enforce tax judgments against 
assets its residents have hidden in the United States, even if the U.S. revoked the revenue 
rule and allowed courts to enforce foreign tax judgments. 
Even without personal jurisdiction, however, the existence of hidden assets in a 
state should generally provide a U.S. court with jurisdiction to recognize and enforce 
foreign judgments.  A state can exercise judicial jurisdiction in some cases to seize assets 
within the state if it otherwise would have jurisdiction.275  Additionally, the Supreme 
Court has held that "when claims to the property itself are the source of the underlying 
controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant, it would be unusual for the State 
where the property is located not to have jurisdiction."276  
In the case of a final judgment for taxes due by a person hiding assets in the 
United States, the claim is for the hidden assets, and their presence in a state generally 
provides in rem jurisdiction.  Even if the presence of the assets were insufficient to create 
jurisdiction underlying a claim, however, the Supreme Court allows that "a State in which 
property is located should have jurisdiction to attach that property, by use of proper 
procedures, as security for a judgment being sought in a forum where the litigation can be 
maintained consistently with International Shoe." 277   Either way, even where the 
defendant is a nonresident alien, if she hides assets in the U.S., U.S. courts have 
jurisdiction to enforce foreign tax judgments. 
D. Evaluating the Foreign Country’s Revenue Judgment 
Courts have proven adept at evaluating the procedure leading to foreign 
judgments.  While final judgments from foreign courts are presumptively conclusive,278 
where the defendant can demonstrate that the foreign process was unfair, fraudulent, or 
otherwise compromised, the U.S. court can decline to recognize and enforce the 
judgment.279  And it appears that U.S. courts do, in fact, evaluate the fairness of the 
process and do, in fact, decline to recognize and enforce fraudulent judgments, judgments 
that lacked due process, and other judgments that violated U.S. public policy.280  There is 
no reason to believe that courts that have the ability to evaluate procedural fairness in 
non-revenue cases would lose that ability where the underlying judgments were for 
unpaid tax liabilities. 
Revenue claims potentially implicate a second layer of fairness, though: the 
fairness of the imposition of the foreign tax.  Unlike foreign contract claims, where the 
parties presumably negotiated at arm’s length and came to a mutually-agreeable solution, 
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tax laws are enacted and enforced by the sovereign.  Though some taxpayers may, by 
virtue of being voters, have some indirect input into the tax laws, the tax laws do not 
represent an explicit agreement between taxpayers and the government.  As such, it 
would appear necessary for a U.S. court to look not only at the fairness of the judicial 
procedure, but the fairness of the imposition of the tax in the first instance. 
With an inquiry into the fairness of a foreign tax, U.S. courts would begin to 
enter perilous waters.  Such an evaluation, with no explicit parameters, would create a 
significant risk of infringing on a country’s sovereignty.  Here, rather than just 
determining if fair procedure occurred, U.S. courts would evaluate whether the country 
had designed an appropriate law.  The foreign country could see a U.S. court’s refusing to 
enforce a tax judgment on the grounds that the tax system did not meet U.S. public policy 
as a direct challenge to its right to make its own laws.  Moreover, judging the fairness of 
a foreign tax system risks economic imperialism.  The safest way for a foreign country to 
demonstrate that its tax system met U.S. standards of fairness would be for that country 
to adopt a U.S.-style income tax.  
A law revoking the revenue rule could cabin these problems, even as it left 
discretion to judges to make this evaluation.  For example, it could limit the permissible 
inquiries a court could make into the fairness of the tax system.  A foreign tax system 
would presumably be unfair, for example, if it imposed tax, or determined the amount of 
the tax, based on the taxpayer’s identity.  Additionally, if the tax law provided no 
mechanism for appeal of a tax determination, U.S. courts could determine that the tax law 
was unfair and decline to enforce the judgment. 
Alternatively, if the U.S. found crafting such rules too burdensome, it could, 
instead, opt to use a blacklist or a whitelist.  If the U.S. opted for a blacklist, it would 
determine which countries did not have a fair tax system, and it would not enforce tax 
judgments from those countries.  Alternatively, if the U.S. chose to implement a whitelist, 
it would determine the countries with presumptively fair tax systems, and would 
generally enforce tax judgments from those countries (subject, of course, to the 
affirmative defenses available to any defendant in any enforcement suit). 
The foreign tax credit and the subpart F provisions of the tax law currently 
blacklist certain countries.  Corporate income earned in these blacklisted countries is 
automatically treated as subpart F income,281 and U.S. taxpayers cannot take a foreign tax 
credit for taxes paid to blacklisted countries.282  A country finds itself on this blacklist if 
the U.S. does not recognize it, if the U.S. has severed diplomatic relations or does not 
conduct such relations, or if the Secretary of State has designated it as repeatedly 
providing support for acts of terrorism.283 
A country can come off of the blacklist in one of two ways: first, the Secretary of 
State can certify to the Secretary of the Treasury that the country no longer meets the 
criteria for inclusion.284  Second, the President can waive the criteria if the President 
determines such waiver is, among other things, in the national interest of the United 
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States.285  Though fourteen countries have found themselves on the blacklist at one time 
or another, currently the blacklist contains only five countries.286 
The foreign tax credit/subpart F blacklist would not work for revenue rule 
purposes, however.  The purpose of such a list associated with the revocation of the 
revenue rule would be to establish which countries’ tax procedures were insufficiently 
fair to warrant U.S. enforcement of tax judgments.  A country’s inclusion on the foreign 
tax credit/subpart F blacklist, on the other hand, has nothing to do with its tax law; 
instead, countries find themselves on the list because of other bad actions. 
If the U.S. implemented a blacklist or a whitelist, it would need to lay out clear 
steps a country could take to get off of, or on to, the list.  Moreover, the administrator of 
the list should be responsive and flexible, so that the list can change quickly when a 
country meets the specified criteria.  The foreign tax credit/subpart F blacklist does not 
appear to have that flexibility: it has not changed since 2005.287  While it is possible that 
none of the countries’ positions have changed in a manner that warrants their removal, 
such a slow rate of change nonetheless does not seem to fit the needs of a revenue rule 
blacklist or whitelist.288 
E. Final Judgment 
As part of the revocation of the revenue rule, the U.S. government would need to 
determine procedures for the recognition and enforcement of foreign tax judgments.  Tax 
judgments are not exceptional, though—they differ from other judgments only in subject 
matter.  As a result, no reason exists why the procedures for recognizing and enforcing a 
tax judgment should differ materially from the procedures currently in place for 
recognizing and enforcing other foreign judgments.  Like the enforcement of non-revenue 
judgments, the enforcement of revenue judgments should provide for an expedited 
judicial procedure to enforce the judgment.289  Notwithstanding the expedited procedure, 
though, the defendant should have the ability to raise certain affirmative defenses.290  
And, importantly, a country seeking enforcement should exhaust present and final 
judgments so that U.S. courts do not need to adjudicate the merits of the dispute.291 
Final judgment may appear to be a high hurdle for requesting mutual assistance.  
In the U.S., the I.R.S. can assess a taxpayer’s taxes.292  Within sixty days after making the 
assessment, it must provide notice to the taxpayer of her unpaid tax and demand the 
payment.293  If she fails to pay, the United States automatically gets a lien against all of 
her property and rights to property in the amount of the liability plus interest, penalties, 
and other additional amounts.294  All of this happens without any judicial intervention.  
                                                     
285 Id. § 901(j)(5)(A). 
286 Rev. Rul. 2005-3; 2005-1 C.B. 334. 
287 Id. 
288 Even if the U.S. figured out a viable way to both create and maintain the blacklist or whitelist, 
such a regime would still risk encouraging jurisdiction-shopping among people intent on hiding their income.  
The jurisdiction-shopping issue would not be too large an impediment, however: avoiding the U.S. 
enforcement of a tax judgment would require an individual to subject herself only to the tax jurisdiction of 
blacklisted countries or of countries not on the whitelist.  While she may be willing to do so, doing business 
in a way that avoids such jurisdiction generally represents real economic choices, not just formal structuring. 
289 See supra note 103  and accompanying text. 
290 See supra notes 91–83 and accompanying text. 
291 See supra notes 78–79- and accompanying text. 
292 I.R.C. § 6201(a) (2012). 
293 I.R.C. § 6303(a) (2012). 
294 I.R.C. § 6321 (2012). 
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Moreover, if, after the notice and demand, she continues to decline to pay, the I.R.S. can 
collect the taxes by levy or by seizure.295  In the end, then, the I.R.S. has the ability to 
collect unpaid taxes without requiring a final judgment. 
Notwithstanding the ability to administratively collect taxes, though, requiring a 
final judgment before helping to collect a foreign tax accords with the United States’ 
current practice.  In each of the tax treaties providing for collection assistance, the tax 
claim of the requesting country must be "finally determined."296  For a tax to be "finally 
determined," not only must the country have the right to collect the revenue (which the 
U.S. can have at the administrative level), but "all administrative and judicial rights of the 
taxpayer to restrain collection in the applicant State have lapsed or been exhausted."297  
In addition to roughly corresponding to the United States’ current practices, 
requiring a final judgment from the other country before enforcing a tax judgment offers 
further safeguards to ensure that the tax is fair.  Rather than trusting a foreign 
administrative agency, U.S. courts can rely on at least a second review of the tax 
assessment. 
F. U.S. Citizen Exceptionalism 
As a practical matter, repealing the revenue rule except in the case of U.S. 
citizens does not create significant problems.  As long as the defendant in a foreign tax 
judgment can demonstrate that she was a U.S. citizen at the time the tax became due, the 
legislation revoking the revenue rule can provide that U.S. courts will not recognize or 
enforce the foreign tax judgment.  If, however, for fairness or other reasons, we believe 
that the revenue rule should be revoked entirely, such complete revocation is still 
feasible.  In addition to the federal revocation of the revenue rule as applied to non-
citizens, individual states could revoke their versions of the revenue rule for U.S. citizens.  
Although the UFMJRA and the UFCMJRA, adopted by many states, have codified the 
revenue rule, the states have generally not adopted the Acts wholesale.  Instead, states 
have tailored the Acts to their own situations, making certain alterations as they saw 
necessary.298   The states could further alter these laws to eliminate the revenue rule 
altogether.  Moreover, states do not risk the same revenue loss as the federal government: 
the vast majority of states do not allow their residents to take a credit for taxes paid to 
foreign governments against their state income taxes.299 
                                                     
295 I.R.C. § 6331(a), (b) (2012). 
296 Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion With 
Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, With Exchanges of Notes, U.S.-Fr., art. 28, Aug. 31, 1994, 1963 
U.N.T.S. 67; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion With 
Respect to Taxes on Income, With Protocol, U.S.-Den., art. 27(2), Aug. 19, 1999, T.I.A.S. No. 11089; 
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion With Respect to 
Taxes on Income, With Understanding and Exchange of Notes, U.S.-Neth., art. 31(2), Dec. 18, 1992, 2291 
U.N.T.S. 3; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion With 
Respect to Taxes on Income, With Exchange of Letters, U.S.-Swed., art. 27(2), Sept. 1, 1994, T.I.A.S.; 
Protocol Amending the Convention of September 26, 1980, With Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, 
With Exchange of Letters, U.S.-Can., art. XXVI A(2), June 14, 1983, T.I.A.S. No. 11087.  
297 TREASURY TECHNICAL EXPLANATION art. 15, supra note 235. 
298 See, e.g., Richard J. Graving & Jon H. Sylvester, Is the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Act 
Potentially Unconstitutional? If So, Should the Texas Cure Be Adopted Elsewhere?, 25 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L 
L. & ECON. 737, 739 n.9 (1992) ("[T]he versions [of the UFMJRA] adopted in some states depart 
significantly in certain respects from the uniform model law."). 
299 Seven states have no personal income tax, and therefore no credits against taxes.  Carol 
Rosenberg & Kim Reuben, State Individual Income Tax Rates, 127 Tax Notes 697, 697 (2010) ("Alaska, 
Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming do not tax personal income . . . .").  Of the 
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As a practical matter, however, states may not have sufficient incentive to allow 
foreign governments access to their courts to collect revenue claims.  Perhaps, if a state 
enforced foreign revenue judgments, the foreign country would likewise enforce the 
state’s tax judgments.  Though there is no data available on the amount of revenue states 
lose as a result of their citizens hiding money offshore, state tax revenue is significantly 
lower than federal revenues.300  Consequently, states likely lose significantly less revenue 
than the federal government.  And with less money at stake, states have less incentive to 
seek reciprocity. 
As a result, placing the primary emphasis for revoking the revenue rule at the 
federal level makes more sense than revoking it at the state level.  At the federal level, 
such revocation would require the passage of a single law, rather than requiring fifty 
legislatures, acting independently, to each revoke the revenue rule.  Such a federal 
revocation would likely not apply to U.S. citizens, based both on the language of the 
current treaties in which the U.S. has agreed to enforce foreign judgments and on the 
potential revenue loss to the government resulting from the foreign tax credit.  Such 
federal revocation would not prevent a state from also revoking its revenue rule.  As a 
secondary matter, some states may want to ensure that foreign courts will enforce their 
tax judgments, contribute to developing countries’ establishing effective tax 
infrastructure, or ensure that they contribute to the implied social contract.301  Irrespective 
of whether or how the federal government permitted the enforcement of foreign tax 
judgments, such a state could allow its courts to enforce foreign tax judgments against 
both citizens and non-citizens. 
                                                                                                                                                 
remaining forty-three states and the District of Columbia, only six allow their residents to deduct taxes paid 
to any foreign country.  ALA. CODE § 40-18-21(a)(1) (2013); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1071(A) (2013); 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 235-55 (2013); IOWA CODE § 422.8(1) (2013); MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-30-2302(1)(a) 
(2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-153.9 (2013).  Maine allows a foreign tax credit for taxes paid to subdivisions 
of foreign countries that are equivalent to U.S. states.  ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 5217-A (2013).  
Massachusetts and Michigan permit a credit for Canadian taxes, and New York and Vermont allow a credit 
for taxes paid to Canadian provinces.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 62, § 6(a) (2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 206.255(1) (West 2013); N.Y. TAX LAW § 620(a) (McKinney 2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §5825(a) 
(2013).  The remaining thirty-two states and the District of Columbia do not provide a credit for foreign 
taxes.  ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-51-504(a)(1) (West 2013); CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 18001(a) (West 2013); 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-22-108(1) (West 2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-704(a)(1) (West 2013); 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, §1111(a) (West 2013); D.C. CODE § 47-1806.04(a) (2008); GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 48-7-28 (West 2013); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 63-3029(1) (West 2013); 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/601(b)(3) 
(West 2011); IND. CODE ANN. § 6-3-3-3 (West 2013); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-32,111(a) (West 2013); KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.070(1) (West 2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:33(A) (2013); MD. CODE ANN., 
Tax-Gen. § 10-703(a) (West 2013); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.06, subd. 22 (West 2013); MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 27-7-77(1) (West 2012); MO. ANN. STAT. § 143.081(1) (West 2013); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 77-2730(1) 
(West 2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 77:4 (2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54A:4-1(a) (West 2013); N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 7-2-13 (2013); N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-38-30.3(4)(a) (West 2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 5747.05(B) (West 2013); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 2357(B)(1) (West 2013); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 316.082(1) (West 2013); 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7314(a) (West 2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
§ 44-30-18(a) (West 2013); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-6-3400(A)(1) (2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-2-122 (West 
2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-10-1003 (West 2013); VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-332(A) (West 2013); W. VA. 
CODE ANN. § 11-21-20(a) (West 2013); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 71.07 (West 2014). 
300 In 2011, the states collectively collected about $268 billion from their individual income taxes.  
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QUARTERLY SUMMARY OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAX REVENUE (2012), 
available at http://www2.census.gov/govs/qtax/2012/q4t2.xls.  By contrast, the federal government collected 
approximately $1.1 billion in individual income taxes, or four times as much.  CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE 
U.S. FEDERAL BUDGET: A CLOSER LOOK AT REVENUES (2012), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/BS_Revenues_print.pdf. 
301 See supra notes 196–197 and accompanying text. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The United States does not need to be a tax haven.  It does not need to shield 
taxpayers in developing countries from paying their tax liabilities while, at the same time, 
providing foreign aid to those countries.  By permitting developing countries to collect 
taxes from their citizens, the U.S. would help them develop self-sustaining revenue. 
The easiest and most immediate step the U.S. could take in this direction is to 
revoke the revenue rule.  Every state in the United States already stands willing to 
enforce most foreign judgments, whether under the common law or by statute.  Tax 
judgments are not so different that they should be excluded; moreover, the justifications 
that supported the creation and continuance of the revenue rule are no longer compelling. 
Not only is revoking the revenue rule easy; it is also virtually costless to the 
United States.  Eliminating the zero rate of tax on interest paid to nonresident aliens on 
bank accounts and portfolio interest would discourage foreigners from putting money in 
U.S. banks or investing in portfolio debt instruments.  Changing the source rules for 
capital gains would make nonresident aliens think twice before investing in passive U.S. 
assets, including the securities of U.S. companies.  But eliminating the revenue rule will 
not discourage legitimate investment.  True, the U.S. will no longer represent an 
attractive location for nonresident aliens to hide assets from their governments.  In a 
world without the revenue rule, if their governments find the assets hidden in the United 
States, they will be able to use those assets to satisfy their taxpayers’ unpaid taxes.  But 
because the nonresident aliens presumably paid little, if any, tax in the United States, 
losing that tax haven-style investment will not significantly affect the United States’ 
revenue collection.  Moreover, eliminating the revenue rule would not discourage non-
evasive foreign investors from investing in the United States. 
Still, a couple questions potentially remain.  Why should the U.S. discourage 
individuals from hiding assets here?  Although those assets do not provide tax revenue 
for the government, they presumably increase market liquidity and provide benefits to 
other investors by increasing the value of their investments.  Rather than revoke the 
revenue rule, the U.S. could double down, becoming a full-blown tax haven itself.302 
Becoming a tax haven, though, would violate the implied international social 
contract.  It would demonstrate significant hypocrisy from a country that invests so much 
in preventing its own taxpayers from taking advantage of tax havens.  And it would 
prevent other countries from helping the U.S. collect taxes from taxpayers hiding their 
assets offshore.  As a corollary, the willingness of the U.S. to enforce foreign tax 
judgments would allow other countries to reciprocally recognize and enforce U.S. tax 
judgments. 
Would U.S. enforcement of foreign tax judgments really help developing 
countries, though, or would the tax evaders merely shift assets to another tax haven 
jurisdiction?  If evaders merely shifted the location of their hidden assets, the United 
States’ revocation of the revenue rule would not have significantly improved developing 
countries’ revenue collection. 
The answer is not clear.  Presumably, individuals hiding assets in the U.S. have a 
reason to prefer investment in the U.S. to investment in other jurisdiction that provide 
                                                     
302 Though not a common proposal, recently Representative Devin Nunes advocated changing the 
corporate income tax in a way that would "make the U.S. the largest tax haven in human history." Ramesh 
Ponnuru, How to Make America a Global Tax Haven, BLOOMBERGVIEW (Mar. 25, 2013, 6:30 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-25/how-to-make-america-a-global-tax-haven.html. 
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secrecy, low taxes, and non-enforcement of foreign judgments.  The other reasons may be 
sufficient for foreign evaders to keep their money in the United States, even without the 
revenue rule.  If such reasons turned out to be insufficient, though, the intergovernmental 
FATCA agreements and negotiations demonstrate that effecting change in the United 
States can lead to international change.  The United States’ willingness to enforce foreign 
tax judgments, whether unilaterally or by treaty, could similarly spread to other 
jurisdictions, crowding out the ability of tax evaders to hide their assets in a place that 
will not enforce tax judgments. 
The revenue rule serves no legitimate purpose in the current world.  As a moral 
and as an economic matter, the United States should repeal the revenue rule and enforce 
foreign tax judgments. 
